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Remanufacturing
Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of
original manufacturers produces a component of a nal good. The specic component
that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the nal good creates a secondary
market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental
regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The
main results establish that, while collusion of the rms on the level of remanufactura-
bility increases both prot and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion
as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regula-
tion is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the
public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation
can increase both prot and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter
Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can
see their prots increase.
Keywords: remanufacturing, competition, environmental regulation, Porter Hy-
pothesis.
JEL classication: H23, L10, L51, Q53, Q58
31 Introduction
Remanufacturing is a specic type of recycling in which used durable goods are repaired
to a like-new condition. Both remanufacturing and recycling avoid post-consumption waste
while reducing the use of raw materials. However, recycling is an energy-intensive process
that conserves only material value. In attempting to meet multiple environmental objectives,
remanufacturing can be a more suitable option; it preserves most of the added-value by giving
a second life to the product and, typically, reduces the use of energy by eliminating production
steps. This paper develops a model of remanufacturing where a government may either
favor an environmental collusion between producers or introduce an environmental regulation
setting a minimum level of remanufacturability. The impact on prots and consumer surplus
is analyzed.
The level of remanufacturability denes the technical attributes that facilitate the product
reuse and refurbishing at the end of its life. In this sector, waste reuse becomes a design
objective, so that remanufacturability can be seen as a form of green design. Moreover,
since it deals with end-of-life product management and recycled materials, remanufacturing
belongs to the eco-industry as dened by the OECD and Eurostat.1
After a products rst life, recycled material can be redirected towards any industry. On
the contrary, the material going through the remanufacturing process goes back to the same
industry. Then, remanufacturing-oriented designs permit the original manufacturers (OMs)
to access the secondary markets benets. Indeed, while remanufactured products are sold
at 60 to 70 percent of the new products price, their production accounts for only 35 to 60
percent of the original costs [Giuntini and Gaudette 2003]. Therefore, when new products can
1Eco-industries "[...] include cleaner technologies, products and services which reduce environmental risk
and minimize pollution and resource use." [The Environmental Goods and Services Industry: Manual for
Data Collection and Analysis OECD, 1999]
For an introduction to the literature on green design see Fullerton and Wu (1998), Eichner and Pethig
(2001) and Eichner and Runkel (2005). For the literature on eco-industry, see David and Sinclair-Desgagné
(2005) and Canton (2008).
4be substituted with remanufactured ones, original manufacturers may undertake protable
remanufacturing initiatives. Xerox, Kodak, Ford Motor Company and Mercedes-Benz are
examples of corporations that could reduce their production costs with voluntary product
recovery [To¤el 2004]. These corporations are part today of a 60-100 billion dollar industry.
In this framework, the car parts industry is of particular interest. Combined, alternators
and starters represent 80% of remanufactured products [Kim et al. 2008]. Valeo and Bosch
are two important alternator producers in Europe. They started remanufacturing activities
in the early 90s, following the announcement of legislation prohibiting the production, sale
and use of asbestos.2 Since the remanufacturing process requires a lot of handling (disman-
tling, sorting, cleaning...), the removal of the hazardous content is a technological constraint
that has made alternator remanufacturing commercially viable. In its lifetime, the same
car goes through two or three alternators [Kim et al. 2008]. Remanufactured alternators
and starters cover more than 90% of the replacement market and they are produced at a
fraction of the original cost: on average they require 14% of the energy and 12% of the
material necessary for the production of new ones [Steinhilper, 1998]. Representative of the
remanufacturing industry, this reduction in energy and raw material consumption makes
remanufacturing both environmentally desirable and industrially protable. Reduced pro-
duction costs attracts independent remanufacturers (IRs). In 2005, IRs represented 54%
of the aftermarket for automotive parts in Europe and 66% worldwide.3 Inspired by the
alternator anecdote, one of the main purposes of this paper is to describe how green designs
can be costly for the industry and become protable once an environmental regulation is
introduced.4
2This legislation was enacted in 1993 in Germany and in 1997 in France, the respective headquarters of
Bosch and Valeo, with the European Union following suit in 1999 [European Commission 1999].
3Source: Fernand J. Weiland: "Remanufacturing Automotive Mechatronics and Electronics" available at
http://www.apra-europe.org.
4Lund and Hauser (2003) describe data they have collected on the remanufacturing industry in the US.
The motivation behind their work emerges form the fact that the remanufacturing industry has stayed "vir-
tually invisible" to the public and decision makers. This is because of the large variety of remanufactured
products and the small size of actors. The authors list sectors where remanufacturing is important: auto-
5The current paper proposes a theoretical model of remanufacturing framed on the par-
ticularities of the alternator industry. A duopoly of OMs compete on the primary market
where they face the threat of an outsider. The threat insures a price competition that re-
ects the automotive industry: original components being perfectly substitutable, vehicle
manufacturers can switch from one supplier to the other as soon as a lower price is o¤ered.
OMs also compete on the aftermarket where consumers of remanufactured products may
alternatively use the services of competitive IRs. The model pins down the di¤erent incen-
tives in the technology selection determining the level of remanufacturability and explores
the consequences of environmental regulations. In particular, it explains why original alter-
nator manufacturers refrained from adopting a voluntary withdrawal of asbestos from their
production in order to launch protable remanufacturing activities.
Over the years, protability concerns have made remanufacturing a hot topic in the en-
gineering and managerial worlds, witness the ourishing literature on reverse logistic, stock
planning, material demand and return, and case studies.5 Nonetheless, there are only a
handful of economic studies that consider the e¤ect of public interventions on remanufactur-
ing activities. Webster and Mitra (2007) and Mitra and Webster (2008) develop two-period
models where they consider a monopolist on the original market that competes with an IR on
the remanufacturing market. They show the conditions under which take-back regulations
as well as subsidies encourage remanufacturing activities. Like in most previous research
works, they assume a xed level of remanufacturability.
A study by Debo et al. (2005) analyzes the technology selection that determines the
level of remanufacturability. They rst consider an industry where the manufacturer holds a
monopoly on both the original and the remanufacturing market. They then introduce com-
motive and transport, electrical apparatus, toner cartridges, machinery, o¢ce furniture, tires, compressors,
and valves. Other examples cited in the literature include for instance the aerospace industry, single-use
cameras, hospital beds, or pulse sensors.
5See for instance Ferrer (1997), Kiesmuller and Laan (2001), Majumder and Groenevelt (2001), Lebreton
and Tuma (2006), Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006), Chung and We (2008).
6petition in the remanufacturing sector where a higher level of remanufacturability invites
entry by IRs.6 Stronger competition on the remanufacturing market pulls down prices and
OMs show lower interest in costly production technology. This result allows to conclude
that any governmental interventions promoting competition on the aftermarket would have
an adverse e¤ect on the level of remanufacturability. This corroborates the observation of
Ferrer (2000) who states that remanufacturing is viable only if the remanufactured product
is priced above its marginal cost. Following Debo et al. (2005), the current model con-
siders the positive one-way externality of remanufacturability on IRs. However, OMs can
endogeneously choose among a range of existing technologies and reduce, for low levels of
remanufacturability, the impact of technological spillovers.
Studies that observe e¤ects of competition on the remanufacturing market generally
assume away competition on the primary market; i.e. they assume a monopolistic original
manufacturer.7 The current model innovates by considering a duopoly and the threat of an
outsider. One major point that distinguishes the current model from the previous literature is
the perfect market segmentation between new and remanufactured products. In an industry
where there is a need for compatibility between the component and the nal good, and where
the component can be remanufactured several times, the need for new good production on
the aftermarket is negligible. In the alternator industry, more than 90% of the aftermarket
is lled with remanufactured products.
Other literatures that can be used to understand this remanufacturing market include the
literature on durable goods with repeated purchases as well as the economics of innovation
6Since remanufacturability gives the products a positive value at the end of their life, OMs have the
incentive to o¤er remanufacturable products when the end of life value is reected in the original product
price.
7See for instance Carlton and Waldman (2009), Mitra and Webster (2008), Webster and Mitra (2007),
Debo et al. (2005) and Majumder and Groenevelt (2001). In a di¤erent context, Heese et al. (2005)
study a duopoly that compete on the primary market. In their model, new products have a positive initial
remanufacturability level. Hence the rst mover in launching take-back strategy can deter the competitor
by o¤ering a new product with a lower price that includes a discount for the consumer who will return the
used product.
7in the presence of technological spillovers. These topics will be discussed below.
Finally, similarities between recycling and remanufacturing are such that they use compa-
rable public interventions.8 Furthermore, because recyclable and remanufacturable products
present common characteristics in their conception [Steinhilper 1998], regulations aimed at
either recycling or remanufacturing may interchangeably foster one activity or the other.
The main results show that in the absence of environmental regulation, collusion leads
to a higher level of remanufacturability while increasing both prots and consumer surplus.
When remanufacturability is environmentally desirable, the government may use collusion
on the level of remanufacturability as a substitute for an environmental regulation. In the
absence of public intervention, the threat of entry on the primary market keeps the original
price at the production cost of non-remanufacturable products. Consequently, the OM who
decides to produce remanufacturable goods must absorb the full cost of remanufacturing-
oriented technologies. This phenomenon explains what has refrained alternator producers to
adopt remanufacturable technologies prior to the regulation on asbestos. The introduction
of an environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability reduces
the threat of the outsider, since potential entrants will be subjected to the same regulation.
Softened market competition leads to an increase in the original product price and corre-
spondingly higher OMs prots. This result is in line with the Porter Hypothesis stating
that environmental regulations may increase prots in regulated industries. Finally, under
specic circumstances, an environmental regulation can also increase consumer surplus.
2 The Model
A duopoly of identical original manufacturers (OMs) produce an intermediate good m (the
alternator), which enters as a component of a nal consumption good (the vehicle). This
constitutes the primary market and the components rst life. The lifetimes of the component
8See Fullerton and Wu 1998; Eichner and Pethig 2001; Eichner and Runkel 2005; To¤el et al. 2008.
8and the nal good are respectively l and L, with l < L. Consequently, consumers of the
nal good all have to replace the defective component at each of the b replacement periods,
where b = (L=l)  1. This creates an aftermarket.
The components original life aims specically at the original nal good industry with
one component per product. Used components can be remanufactured several times and, at
any moment, there is an equal number of nal goods and components on the market.
When they originally produce a remanufacturable component, OMs participate in the
aftermarket by recovering and remanufacturing used products. On this market, however,
they face competition from independent remanufacturers (IRs).
2.1 Technology
Each OM i, i 2 f1; 2g, controls its level of remanufacturability qi, a technology choice
corresponding to the ease with which a used product can be remanufactured9 and leading
to decreasing unit remanufacturing costs cr(qi) and cs(qi), for OMs and IRs respectively.
However, OMs benet from economies of scope between new and remanufactured products10
and, for any given q, have lower unit remanufacturing costs than IRs. This technological
advantage for OMs over the IRs is represented by the following properties:
cs(q)  cr(q)  0; and asymptotically: lim
qi!1
(cs(q)  cr(q)) = 0: (1)
For large levels of remanufacturability, remanufacturing becomes equally accessible for IRs.
9In most models [see for instance Debo et al. 2005; Majumder and Groenevelt 2001; Ferrer and Swami-
nathan 2006] the level of remanufacturability is the percentage of remanufacturable used products. While the
share of un-remanufacturable cores can exceed 30% for certain products, it is less than 15% for alternators
[Kim et al. 2008]. In the present model, this number is assumed to be negligible so that the alternator/vehicle
ratio stays equal to 1.
10Carlton and Waldman (2009) also assume economies of scope between the production of new parts and
remanufactured ones.
9To make the original product more remanufacturable, OMs bear additional production
costs reected by an increasing and convex initial manufacturing cost, cm (qi).
2.2 Demand functions
The demand for the component is segmented into two types: the demands for new and for
remanufactured products.
The demand for new products m is driven by nal good producers. It is assumed that
any variation in the original component price represents a small share of the nal good
production cost and, hence, the demand for m stays inelastic for a reasonably large range of
prices (or until a certain choke price). Except for great demand elasticities, this assumption
does not a¤ect the results, but lightens the model. For simplicity, m is normalized to 1.
The demand for remanufactured products comes from nal consumers. It is assumed
that consumers always opt for remanufactured products.11 Consumer types are uniformly
distributed over  2 [0; 1], where + is the willingness to pay for a replacement good. The
positive constant  indicates that even individuals from the lower bound are willing to pay
a positive amount. When remanufacturing used products, OMs provide the properties and
warranty of new goods while IRs supply products of lower quality.12 As a result, consumers
will express lower willingness to pay for IRs products. The parameter  2 [0; 1] reects this
perceived depreciation in quality.
At each replacement period, individuals maximize their consumer surplus by purchasing
11In other models, two scenarios generally bring new products on the aftermarket. In the rst one,
products di¤erentiation leads to a positive demand for new replacement products (for instance, in the case of
rapid obsolescence like in the computer market). In the second one, the elastic aftermarket demand cannot
be fullled solely with remanufactured products (like in the disposable camera market). In the alternator
industry, the need for compatibility makes product di¤erentiation negligible between new and remanufactured
products. Also, the potential supply of remanufactured products correspond to the potential demand since
there is one alternator per vehicle and each alternator can be remanufactured several times.
12For the same two year warranty, OMs remanufactured products are twice the price of IRs products
[Kim et al. 2008]. This suggests a di¤erence in quality. For instance, IRs products may require more visits
to the mechanic.
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a product coming from an OM, an IR or no product at all. This maximization problem is
given by: max[ +    pr; (1   ) +    ps; 0], where pr and ps are respectively the selling
price of OMs and IRs products. Because the component price represents a small fraction
of the nal goods value,   ps mimics the inelastic aftermarket and ensures that everyone
consumes a replacement good; that is, r + s = 1, where variables r and s designate the
demand for components remanufactured by the OMs and the IRs respectively. Figure 1
illustrates the willingness to pay for the two di¤erentiated products.
The set of consumers buying remanufactured products from the OMs is dened by  such
that  +    pr  (1   ) +    ps, or equivalently:   (pr   ps) =. In Figure 1, given
prices pr and ps, individual q is indi¤erent between the two products. Types  2 [q; 1]
prefer OMs services while the others,  2 [0; q], purchase lower quality goods. The shaded
area corresponds to the total consumer surplus at each replacement period.
Given a uniform distribution for , the demand for products remanufactured by the OMs
at each period is r = 1  (pr ps

) so that the inverse demand function is:
pr = (1  r) + ps: (2)
2.3 Industrial structure
Competition in the industry is described by the following four-stage game. In the rst
stage, two identical OMs produce the original component and control its level of remanu-
facturability qi. Two di¤erent competitive environments will be considered in determining
qi: non-cooperation and collusion. Since each rm can end up remanufacturing the others
products, these scenarios internalize, or not, the fact that rms can free-ride on each others
technology selection qi.
13
13It has been observed in the alternator industry that i) Bosch remanufactures Valeos alternators; ii)
Valeo remanufactures Boschs alternators; and iii) although, for a given vehicle model, alternators must
meet standards set by the automobile constructor, Bosch and Valeos products are not identical.
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In the second stage, OMs set the original products prices and quantities pmi and mi.
They face the threat of an outsider that would seize any prot opportunities originating from
the original market but who stays blind on what occurs on the remanufacturing market.14
This threat forces price competition between OMs.
The third and fourth stages occur on the aftermarket. Although this market is shared
with IRs, OMs hold an oligopolistic power on high quality products. In the third stage,
OMs compete by choosing quantities ri. In the nal stage, IRs compete perfectly and their
remanufactured goods price is established.
Because of the inelastic aftermarket size, it is assumed that OMs and IRs cannot dis-
criminate between products that have di¤erent levels of remanufacturability (everything has
to be remanufactured).
OMs have perfect knowledge of each other. Their decisions in each stage are made and
applied simultaneously. They also have perfect information about IRs characteristics. Since
OMs are identical, a symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in the four-
stage game is computed.
3 The optimization problem
Under the market clearing conditions, m1+m2 = 1 and r1+r2 = r. The OMs prot function
depends on both their activities on the primary market and the remanufacturing market:
i = (pmi   cm (qi))mi +
bX
t=1
tl [(pr  micr(qi) mjcr(qj))ri]| {z }
Ri(ri;rj ;mi;mj ;qi;qj)
for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i
14Two arguments are proposed in order to explain this behaviour. The rst one assumes that reputation
is an important factor in being considered as an OM and, therefore, new entrants cannot benet from a
price premium on the aftermarket. The second point considers that incumbents face less risk and are more
willing to accept delayed prots.
12
where pr = (1  r) + ps from equation (2) and 0 < l < 1 is the discount factor associated
with the length of time l. The rst term is the net prot from the original market while
Ri(ri; rj;mi;mj; qi; qj) corresponds to the discounted prot from all the remanufacturing
periods. Because used products randomly go to any remanufacturer, the remanufacturing
cost depends on the technology selection of each OM and is weighed by their respective
participation in the original market.
3.1 Prices and quantities
Using backward induction, the nal stage is solved rst. IRs are perfectly competitive and
the selling price ps is set at the average unit cost of remanufacturing:
ps = mics(qi) +mjcs(qj): (3)
In the third stage, each OM i maximizes its prot on the aftermarket by choosing its
supply of remanufactured products ri, and by taking the supply choice of its opponents rj
as well as the levels of remanufacturability (qi; qj) as given. It also considers IRs behavior
through equation (3). The OMs maximization problem at this stage is:
max
ri0
Ri =
bX
t=1
tl [((1  (ri + rj)) +mi(cs(qi)  cr(qi)) +mj(cs(qj)  cr(qj)))ri]
for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i
and the rst-order condition is:
@Ri
@ri
= 0()
bX
t=1
tl [   rj   2ri +mi(cs(qi)  cr(qi)) +mj(cs(qj)  cr(qj))] = 0: (4)
13
The Nash equilibrium for the supply of remanufactured products is dened by:
ri (mi;mj; qi; qj) =
 +mi(cs(qi)  cr(qi)) +mj(cs(qj)  cr(qj))
3
for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i (5)
and the second-order condition for an interior maximum is respected when evaluated at the
equilibrium ri .
Here, IRs play a passive role since their price is driven by the OMs choice of remanufac-
turability (equation 3). Also, they only have a residual participation in the aftermarket; the
demand for their products depends on OMs supply decisions with s = 1  2ri . Note that
the choice of 2ri also corresponds to OMs aftermarket share.
In the second stage, the two OMs compete on the primary market where the threat of
the outsider keeps the component price pmi at the minimum production cost; that is,
pm1 = pm2 = cm(0): (6)
By o¤ering a common original price, OMs share this market equally with mi = 1=2. If a
higher price is set, the outsider, by proposing the lowest level of remanufacturability, can
make a strictly positive prot and deter competitors. Note that in spite of that restriction,
OMs may still optimally choose a positive level of remanufacturability and, consequently,
run a decit on the primary market (pmi   cm(qi) = cm(0)  cm(qi)  0). This is consistent
with the existing literature on durable goods with switching costs. In the current model of
repeated purchases, the need for compatibility between the component and the nal good
induces a consumer cost of switching to other models of alternators. One standard result
shows how switching costs cause a price war for initial market share.15 Here, xing the
original price at the lowest production cost prevents the entry by the outsider and secures
15See Klemperer (1995) for an introduction to the literature. The author relates the example of banks,
giving free banking services to college students. Students who open current accounts are then charged high
fees once they graduate. Expected prots in subsequent periods induce a price war for initial market share.
14
the original market to the duopoly.
Two situations are considered for the determination of qi and qj in the rst stage. The
rst case reects the non-cooperative problem that occurs when an OM remanufactures used
products from random origin and free-rides on the technology selection of the other. The
second case considers the possibility of an agreement between the OMs. These situations
are explicitly formulated in subsections 3.3 and 3.4.
Before solving for the choice of remanufacturability, an important assumption on the
technology selection is introduced in the coming subsection.
3.2 Assumption on the technology selection
At this step, only the rst stage equilibrium remains to be solved and everything thereafter
depends on the technology selection (qi; qj) taken as given. The prot function is:
i = (cm(0)  cm(qi))
1
2
+
bX
t=1
tl [r

i (qi; qj)
2]| {z }
Ri(qi;qj)
(7)
where the optimal supply of remanufactured products (equation 5) is reduced to:
ri (qi; qj) =
 + cs(qi)  cr(qi)
6
+
 + cs(qj)  cr(qj)
6
(8)
when the individual market share in equilibrium, mi = 1=2, is taken into account.
A variation in q a¤ects the prot through two channels: i) the original production cost
cm(qi); and ii) the total net revenue of remanufacturing activities Ri(qi; qj). Since OMs are
identical, the analysis will focus on symmetric equilibria qi = qj = q. OMs know that, for
any given q, their prot depends substantially on their technological advantage: cs(q) cr(q).
15
The comparative static
@ri
@q
=
c0s(q)  c
0
r(q)
3
(9)
indicates that, with an increasing technological advantage, a higher level of remanufactura-
bility leads to a larger aftermarket share and, consequently, higher remanufacturing revenues.
The following assumption completes the description of the technological advantage intro-
duced in section 2.1. It is assumed that OMs have access to a wide range of remanufacturable
and substitutable technologies. In dealing with the fact that IRs benet from the positive
externality of remanufacturability (through c0s(q) < 0), OMs endogeneously rank order tech-
nologies with respect to their marginal technological advantage, c0s(q)   c
0
r(q). In other
words, OMs will prioritize technologies where their relative cost reduction is the largest.
Consequently, for low levels of remanufacturability, c0s(q)  c
0
r(q) is positive and large. This
is because the wide technology choice allows OMs to shape the original product in order to
suit their own remanufacturing facilities or assembly lines.16 As the level of remanufactura-
bility goes higher, the range of technology choices lessens and c0s(q) c
0
r(q) decreases. As long
as c0s(q)   c
0
r(q) > 0, OMs have an incentive to choose higher levels of remanufacturability
since it increases their aftermarket share (see equation 9). At some q = bq, higher levels of
remanufacturability leads to the adoption of technologies that reduce their aftermarket share
with c0s(q) c
0
r(q)  0. This situation occurs for instance when a larger q eliminates disassem-
bly or reassembly steps originally costlier for IRs.17 For high levels of remanufacturability,
q > eq, OMs are constrained with end of tail technologies, i.e. non-substitutable technologies
specically designed for high performance. Beyond eq, higher levels of remanufacturability
16For instance, in the toner cartridge industry, some rms have added an electronic key in their remanu-
facturable cartridges that must be reset by the OM. This leads to an increase in the relative remanufacturing
cost of IRs [Majumder and Groenevelt 2001].
17By the mean value theorem, c0s(q) c
0
r(q)  0; for at least some q; is an essential condition for the respect
of equation (1).
16
slowly reduce the gap between OMs and IRs remanufacturing costs. Formally, with bq < eq;
the technological advantage is described by equation (1) and:
c0s(q)  c
0
r(q)
8>>><>>>:
> 0 for q < bq
= 0 for q = bq
 0 for q > bq
and c00s(q)  c
00
r(q)
8>>><>>>:
< 0 for q < eq
= 0 for q = eq
 0 for q > eq
(10)
This assumption is in line with a broader literature on innovation. The rst part, when
c0s(q)   c
0
r(q) > 0, shows the predominance of post-innovation competitive advantage while
the second part, when c0s(q)   c
0
r(q)  0, is the result of an increasing relative rate of
technological spillovers.18 The presence of IRs therefore determines, through technology, the
extent to which OMs reach the aftermarket. Variation of the technological advantage with
the level of remanufacturability is illustrated in Figure 2.
3.3 The non-cooperative case
Each manufacturer i maximizes its prots by choosing the level of remanufacturability qi,
taking the technology choice of the other qj as given and considering the optimal supply of
remanufactured products ri (qi; qj). Used products are randomly dispatched among reman-
ufacturers (both OMs and IRs) and, therefore, the technology selection of i is subject to
free-riding. The maximization problem is:
max
qi0
i = (cm(0)  cm(qi))
1
2
+
bX
t=1
tl

ri (qi; qj)
2

for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i
s.t. ri (qi; qj) =
 + cs(qi)  cr(qi)
6
+
( + cs(qj)  cr(qj))
6
,
18See for instance dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) or Celleni and Lambertini (2009). Goel (1990)
studies the R&D decision of a Stackelberg leader (the OMs here) when the follower (the IRs here) benets
from one-way spillovers. The author argues that the leader sustains a dominant role when R&D investment
implies a greater cost reduction than for the follower. In the current model, that is c0s(q)  c
0
r(q) > 0.
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and the rst-order condition is:
@i
@qi
= 0()  
c0m(qi)
2
+
bX
t=1
tl

2(c0s(qi)  c
0
r(qi))
6
ri (qi; qj)

= 0
for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i
where the marginal cost of a higher level of remanufacturability is equal to the marginal
revenue generated when the choice of the other is taken as xed. The symmetric Nash
equilibrium qnc is dened by:
 c0m(q

nc) +
bX
t=1
tl

2(c0s(q

nc)  c
0
r(q

nc))
3
ri (q

nc)

| {z }
R0(qnc)
= 0 (11)
where the subscript nc stands for the non-cooperative case. It is assumed that the second-
order condition for an interior maximum is respected when evaluated at the symmetric
equilibrium qnc.
19 In the presence of a corner solution qnc = 0, the component is not reman-
ufacturable.
A positive qnc denotes voluntary remanufacturing activities in the industry.
3.4 The collusive case
In this scenario, OMs agree on a unique level of remanufacturability qi = qj = qc, where the
subscript c refers to the collusive case. OMs internalize each others free-riding behaviour by
choosing the level of remanufacturability qc that maximizes joint prot (however they still
19The second-order condition is  c00m(q

nc)+ R
00(qnc)  0. For any given q, R
00(q) =Xb
t=1
tl
h
2
3

(c00
s
(q) c00
r
(q))
3 r

i (q) +
(c0
s
(q) c0
r
(q))2
3
i
. From the specications of equation (10), the condition
is satised in a large neighbourhood of q = bq. Note that if c00s (q) c00r (q) is monotonically increasing for q < eq,
then when a maximum exists, it is included in the neighbourhood of q = bq and it is unique.
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su¤er from IRs free-riding activities), which becomes:
max
q0
1 + 

2 = (cm(0)  cm(qc)) + 2
bX
t=1
tl [r

i (qc)
2] (12)
s.t. ri (qc) =
 + cs(qc)  cr(qc)
3
.
The rst-order conditions is:
@i
@q
= 0()  
c0m(q

c )
2
+
bX
t=1
tl

2(c0s(q

c )  c
0
r(q

c ))
3
ri (q

c )

| {z }
R0(qc )
= 0 (13)
and it is assumed that the second-order condition for an interior maximum is respected when
evaluated at qc .
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3.5 Welfare analysis
The consumer surplus is now compared for the two scenarios. Here, consumer surplus on the
original market is ignored since prices and quantities stay unchanged. Referring to Figure
1, the consumer surplus on the aftermarket is dened by: Sr =
Xb
t=1
tl
hR 1
q
( +   pr)@
+
R q
0
((1  ) +   ps)@
i
: Markets clear in equilibrium, therefore 1   q = 2r

i . Using
(2), (3) and (8), the total consumer surplus for a given q becomes:
Sr(q) =
bX
t=1
tl
2

(1  ) + ri (q)
2 + 2(  cs(q))

: (14)
Proposition 1 Collusion, compared to non-cooperation, leads to:
i) a higher level of remanufacturability: qnc < q

c ;
20The second-order condition is  c00m(q

c )=2+ R
00(qc )  0. See footnote 19 for details.
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ii) a larger market share of good quality remanufactured products: ri (q

nc) < r

i (q

c );
iii) higher prots: i (q

nc) < 

i (q

c ); and
iv) higher consumer surplus: Sr(q

nc) < Sr(q

c ).
Proof: The optimal choice of qnc and q

c are determined by equations (11) and (13).
From the second-order condition,  c00m(q)=2+ R
00(q)  0. Therefore, qnc < q

c . Both q

nc and
qc are in a neighbourhood where R
0(q) > 0 () (c0s(q)  c
0
r(q)) > 0 . Hence, from equation
(9), ri (q

nc) < r

i (q

c ). 

i (q

nc) < 

i (q

c ) because the externality is internalized: We can nd
that @Sr(q)=@q =
Xb
t=1
tl
2
[2ri (q)@r

i (q)=@q   2c
0
s(q)]. Since R
0(q) > 0() @ri (q)=@q > 0,
we have that @Sr(q)=@q jq=qnc; qc> 0 and Sr(q

nc) < Sr(q

c ):
Figure 3a illustrates i (q) (the lower curve) and shows q

nc < q

c as well as 

i (q

nc) <
i (q

c ) (points e and b). When the economy changes from non-cooperation to collusion,
prices in the remanufacturing sector (equations 2 and 3) strictly decrease while the market
share of good quality products increases. Therefore, collusion benets not only producers
but also consumers. This result recalls Carlton and Waldman (2009) where the monopolist
on the original market is also the low-cost remanufacturer. Comparing with the competitive
case, monopolizing the remanufacturing market increases welfare since used products are
remanufactured in the lowest cost manner. In their model however, the monopolist captures
all the benets and the consumer surplus stays unchanged.
Proposition 1 suggests that a government could substitute environmental regulations by
legislating industrial agreements on the level of remanufacturability. The parallel can be
made with the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, in the US, which promotes col-
lusion on innovation and R&D. Extended producer responsibility, a new type of regulation
where producers are responsible for their end-of-life product management,21 also o¤ers plat-
forms where certain kinds of collusions are encouraged. In the alternator industry, these
21See for instance the EU Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive.
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agreements could take place within manufacturers and remanufacturers associations like the
international Automotive Parts Remanufacturers Association or the United States Council
for Automotive Research.22
4 Environmental regulation
In this economy, the government may decide to introduce an environmental regulation which
establishes a minimum level of remanufacturability, denoted by q.
Here, the objective is not to solve for the social planners problem, but to observe how
the industry would react in case of an environmental regulation. In particular, the analysis
shows under which conditions the OMs go along with the regulation or resist compliance
with it.
4.1 Public intervention
Under public intervention, the four stages stay the same but rms face a more stringent
technological constraint: qi  q. Because this regulation applies also to the outsider, the
minimum production cost increases at cm(q) and the second stage equilibrium leads to an
increased original components price:
pm1 = pm2 = cm(q):
Hence, the prot function becomes:
i(qk) = (cm(q)  cm(qk))
1
2
+
bX
t=1
tl

ri (qk)
2

(15)
22See http://apra.org/ and www.uscar.org.
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where i and qk designate the prot and the optimal level of remanufacturability under envi-
ronmental regulations. With k 2 fnc; cg, equation (15) stands for either the non-cooperative
or the collusive case and respects the equilibrium condition which stays equation (11) or (13).
An environmental regulation will be e¤ective if it is larger than voluntary remanufactura-
bility, i.e. when q > qk. However, if a regulation applies to di¤erent industries with uneven
remanufacturing initiatives, the regulation might be non-e¤ective for some industries with
q < qk. In this case, the regulation constraint is not biding and the selected level of reman-
ufacturability stays unchanged. The applied level of remanufacturability and the di¤erence
in prots before and after regulation are:
qk =
8<: qk if qk  qq if qk  q (16)
i(qk)  

i (q

k) =
8>><>>:
(cm(q) cm(0))
2
if qk  q
(cm(qk) cm(0))
2
+
bX
t=1
tl [(r

i (q)
2   ri (q

k)
2)] if qk  q
(17)
Figure 3a shows how prots vary with the imposition of a regulation in the collusive case.
Figure 3b combines both the collusive and the non-cooperative cases. The vertical distance
between the curves i(qk) and the horizontal lines 

i (q

k) describes the di¤erence in prots
due to all possible levels of regulation. The light and medium shade areas show the non-
cooperative case while the medium and dark shade areas exhibit the collusive case.
When the regulation is non-e¤ective (i.e. when qk = q

k  q), the level of remanufactura-
bility stays unchanged. However, the OMs prot increases by (cm(q)  cm(0))=2 due to the
higher original product price. For the collusive (non-cooperative) case, this corresponds to
the vertical distance in the triangle abc (def).
An e¤ective regulation (qk = q > q

k) inuences OMs prots through two e¤ects. First,
price and cost are now equal on the primary market and OMs initial decit vanishes. This
shifts up prots by (cm(q

k)   cm(0))=2. For the collusive (non-cooperative) case, this is
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the vertical distance bc (ef). Second, a higher level of remanufacturability inuences OMs
technological advantage and, consequently, their ability to reach a larger aftermarket share
(equations 9 and 10). As long as the OMs gain technological advantage, c0s(q)   c
0
r(q)  0,
their prots increase. When c0s(q)   c
0
r(q)  0, the technological gap lessens and OMs see
their aftermarket share reduced. Thereafter, the prot under regulation decreases until it
reaches the initial rms prot i (q

k) at q = q
max
k (at point g (h)), where the second e¤ect
overtakes the rst one. Above this threshold, regulation results in net costs for the OMs.
Total variation following an e¤ective regulation is represented by bcg (efcgh) and the shaded
area beyond gh (h).
Proposition 2 Environmental regulations can increase rms benets in both the non-cooperative
and the collusive cases:
i(qk)  

i (q

k) > 0() q < q
max
k :
In particular, this remains true when the environmental regulation is e¤ective:
i(qk)  

i (q

k) > 0() q

k  q < q
max
k
This result coincides with the Porter Hypothesis, which says that prots may increase in
the industry with the application of environmental regulations. The present model corrobo-
rates the argument of Ambec and Barla (2007) under which the Porter Hypothesis requires
the presence of at least one market imperfection beside the environmental externality. The
phenomenon is here the result of two market characteristics.
The rst is the threat of the outsider on the primary market, which keeps the original
price at the minimum production cost. Hence, OMs cannot pass on the information through
prices that a product is remanufacturable. The competitive nal good producers do not
benet from remanufacturability and see no incentive in raising production costs. Therefore,
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the selling price stays pm = cm(0). When the regulation takes place, the selling price pm
carries the information up to the point justied by the public intervention (pm = cm(q)).
This result shows how free-entry on the original alternator market has prevented OMs from
engaging in remanufacturing initiatives and how the asbestos ban was welcomed by the
industry.
The second characteristic occurs in the non-cooperative scenario. From Proposition 1, it
is known that collusion leads to higher prots. Here, the regulation solves for this collective
action problem. Although non-cooperation is not a necessary condition in conrming the
Porter Hypothesis, it increases the extent to which regulations generate prots. This specic
e¤ect is graphically represented in Figure 3 by the area framed above and below by the
horizontal lines i (q

c ) and 

i (q

nc), and to the left by eb. André et al. (2009) obtains similar
results when a duopoly simultaneously choose between the production of a "standard" or
a "green" product. A discrete choice of options can keep the standard quality as the Nash
equilibrium, even if Pareto dominated by the green choice. Therefore, a regulation that
forces cooperation between rms for the environmentally-friendly option can benet rms,
consumers and the environment. This additional role given to the regulation explains the
di¤erence between the non-cooperative and the collusive scenarios and leads to propositions
3 and 4.
In view of the positive variation in prots, any regulation below qmaxk should be positively
supported by the OMs. In contrast, regulations above qmaxk are likely to meet resistance in
their application. The di¤erence in prots before and after the regulation (equation 17) can
therefore be interpreted as the intensity of compliance or resistance towards the regulation.
Hence:
Proposition 3 It is always easier to introduce an environmental regulation q under the
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non-cooperative case:
i(qnc)  

i (q

nc) > i(qc)  

i (q

c )
Proposition 4 The maximum level of regulation positively supported by the industry is
larger under the non-cooperative case:
qmaxc < q
max
nc :
In the absence of environmental regulation, the government can promote collusion as
a substitute for regulation. However, when a regulation is scheduled, collusion should be
repressed since non-cooperation better supports the regulation.
4.2 Intervention maximizing OMs prot
Let q denotes the optimal regulation that would be chosen by the OMs. This scenario di¤ers
from the collusive case in the absence of regulation; for whichever level of remanufacturability
chosen by the OMs, the outsider, constrained by the regulation, will not have the opportunity
to produce at lower costs and, consequently, the threat vanishes. With pm1 = pm2 = cm(q),
the maximization problem is:
max
q0
i =
bX
t=1
tl [r

i (q)
2]
s.t. ri (q) =
 + cs(q)  cr(q)
3
.
The optimal condition is:
@i
@q
= 0() c0s(q
)  c0r(q
) = 0 (18)
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and the second-order condition is always satised. Note that q coincides with bq, the level
of remanufacturability that maximizes the OMs technological advantage (see equation 10).
Figure 3 displays q and i(q
), the privately optimal regulation and the corresponding
prot. Comparing the optimal conditions for the determination of q, qc and q

nc leads to
the following propositions:
Proposition 5 The regulation preferred by the private sector leads to a level of remanufac-
turability above the one chosen in absence of regulation:
q > qc > q

nc
Proof : From Proposition 1, it is already known that qc > q

nc. The optimal conditions
(11) and (13) for the choice of q in absence of environmental regulation imply a positive
value of (c0s(q)   c
0
r(q)): Since c
00
s(q)   c
00
r(q) < 0 in this neighbourhood (equation 10), it is
straightforward to see that the condition leading to the private optimal choice of regulation
(18) results in q > qc > q

nc.
Proposition 6 The size of remanufacturing activities (for the OMs) is maximized if and
only if the public sector xes the regulation at the level preferred by the OMs:
@ri
@q
=
(c0s(q)  c
0
r(q))
3
= 0() q = q
When the regulation is selected by the private sector, OMs take into account the fact
that the entire production cost is covered by the selling price. They can therefore seize the
maximum aftermarket share by costlessly choosing the level of remanufacturability leading
to their largest technological advantage. When q = q, OMss prots are maximized as well
as their aftermarket size.
When OMs remanufacturing activities pollute signicantly less than IRs, the social
planner may want to maximize the OMs aftermarket share to the detriment of higher re-
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manufacturability by choosing q = q.
4.3 Welfare analysis
On the inelastic original market, consumer surplus varies only with the price. Hence, in
equilibrium, it can be dened as Sm = Sm(pm) = Sm(cm(q)) where Sm(a)   Sm(b) =
 [cm(a)   cm(b)] (or equivalently S
0
m(cm(q)) =  c
0
m(q)). Using the consumer surplus on
the remanufacturing market, Sr(q) (equation 14), total consumer surplus in the presence of
a regulation becomes:
S(qk) = Sm(q) +
Xb
t=1
tl
2

(1  ) + ri (qk)
2 + 2(  cs(qk))

:
The change in consumer surplus following an environmental regulation is dened by:
S(qk) Sr(q

k) =
8>>><>>>:
 (cm(q)  cm(0)) if q

k  q
 (cm(q)  cm(0))+Xb
t=1
tl
2
[(ri (q)
2   ri (q

k)
2)  2(cs(q)  cs(q

k))] if q

k  q
(19)
Figure 4a illustrates a particular case of equation (19) in the collusive scenario. Figure
4b combines both the collusive and the non-cooperative cases. The upper curve is the
consumer surplus with respect to the level of remanufacturability in the absence of regulation.
The horizontal line Sr(q

c ) (respectively Sr(q

nc)) is the consumer surplus in the collusive
(non-cooperative) case where, following Proposition 1, Sr(q

c ) > Sr(q

nc). In the presence of
regulation, the lower curve shows the consumer surplus if the industry were to adopt exactly
q, however for low levels of regulation, the industry keeps producing at qk. The vertical
distance between the curves S(qk) and Sr(q

k) describes the di¤erence in consumer surplus
due to all possible level of regulation. The medium and dark (light and medium) shade areas
exhibit the collusive (non-cooperative) case.
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When the regulation is non-e¤ective (i.e. for qk  q), the level of remanufacturability
stays xed but the price increases on the original market. Consumer surplus is therefore
reduced by  (cm(q)  cm(0)), illustrated in the triangle abc (def).
Proposition 7 A non-e¤ective environmental regulation lets the social welfare that equally
weights total prots and consumer surplus unchanged.
[S(qk)  Sr(q

k)] + 2[i(qk)  

i (q

k)] = 0 if q

k  q
A non-e¤ective regulation partially shifts the cost of remanufacturability from OMs to-
wards nal good producers and consumers. This can be seen using equations (17) and (19)
expressing the change in prot and the change in consumer surplus. Considering the environ-
mental neutrality of non-e¤ective regulations, this money transfer leaves the social welfare
unchanged.
When the regulation is e¤ective, it can be shown that for some specic scenarios, a
variation in the level of remanufacturability reduces prices of remanufactured products and
increases the share of high quality goods on the aftermarket so that the net variation in
consumer surplus is positive. Let qcs be the e¤ective environmental regulation that locally
maximizes consumer surplus. The subscript cs designates consumer surplus. The constraints
for a maximum are:
 c0m(q

cs) +
bX
t=1
tl

(c0s(q

cs)  c
0
r(q

cs))
3
ri (q

cs)  c
0
s(q

cs)

= 0:
 c00m(q

cs) +
bX
t=1
tl
"
(c00s(q

cs)  c
00
r(q

cs))
3
ri (q

cs) +
(c0s(q

cs)  c
0
r(q

cs))
3
2
  c00s(q

cs)
#
 0
Comparing with the optimality conditions for the choice of qnc and q

c (equations 11 and 13),
there exists (at least) one local maximum for the function (19) only if qcs  q

k, which occurs
when the decreasing remanufacturing cost c0s is large enough compared to the increasing
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original production cost c0m, when evaluated at q

k.
23 Otherwise, consumer surplus strictly
decreases with more stringent regulation. The regulation can be welfare improving for the
consumer only if S(qcs)  S(q

k), in which case the net positive variation in consumer surplus
is illustrated by the area hij (ghijk) for the collusive (non-cooperative) case. When the
regulation becomes too stringent, the market share of high quality remanufactured products
drops, which causes the consumer surplus to decrease. At qmaxk;cs (beyond j (k)), the regulation
is a net cost for the consumer. This leads to the following propositions:
Proposition 8 When S(qcs)  S(q

k), an e¤ective environmental regulation can increase
consumer surplus:
S(q)  Sr(q

k)  0 if q
min
k;cs  q  q
max
k;cs
More particularly, when S(qcs)  S(q

k) and q
min
k;cs  q
max
k , an e¤ective environmental regula-
tion can increase both prots and consumer surplus:
i(qk)  

i (q

k)  0 and S(q)  Sr(q

k)  0 if q
min
k;cs  q  minfq
max
k;cs ; q
max
k g
Under some circumstances, the government can apply an environmental regulation for
which, in addition to environmental advantages, producers and consumers benet from higher
prots and lower prices.
Proposition 9 It is always easier to introduce an e¤ective environmental regulation under
the non-cooperative case:
S(qnc)  Sr(q

nc) < S(qc)  Sr(q

c )
23Note that, under certain conditions, the consumer surplus function in the presence of regulation allows
for multiple maxima for q  qk. For simplicity, the following results are presented for cases where there is
at most one maximum.
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Proposition 10 When S(qcs)  S(q

k) for k = c; nc, the range of regulations positively
supported by consumers is larger under the non-cooperative case:
qmaxnc;cs   q
min
nc;cs > q
max
c;cs   q
min
c;cs :
This stays true when S(qcs)  S(q

nc) and S(q

cs)  S(q

c ) since
qmaxnc;cs   q
min
nc;cs  0
Propositions 9 and 10 say that, when the di¤erence in consumer surplus before and
after the regulation is interpreted as the intensity of political support for the regulation, the
government should repress collusion. These results are in line with Propositions 3 and 4
where rms are more likely to comply with the public intervention when they compete on
the level of remanufacturability.
5 Conclusion
Original manufacturers produce a component as an input for the nal good where the threat
of an outsider keeps the inputs price at the minimum production cost. At the same time,
they select the technology determining the level of remanufacturability of their products.
Later, consumers of the nal good have to replace the specic component. They consider
products remanufactured by either independent remanufacturers or original manufacturers,
and they are willing to pay a price premium for the latter. In this set-up, used products can
be remanufactured by any rms, causing original manufacturers to su¤er from free-riding on
their technology selection and discouraging investment in remanufacturing-oriented designs.
When the original manufacturers collude on the level of remanufacturability, they only face
free-riding from independent remanufacturers and select a higher level of remanufacturability.
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Collusion benets producers and, by reducing prices on the aftermarket, consumers.
Remanufacturing benets the population through less post-consumption waste, lower en-
ergy and raw material consumptions, and lower prices for replacement products. It can also
benet the industry through the generation of positive prots. While the gains of remanu-
facturing are shared among the society, the costs of remanufacturing-oriented technology are
born solely by the original manufacturers. Consequently, public regulation may be necessary.
The introduction of an environmental regulation, which imposes a minimal level of reman-
ufacturability, justies a price increase on the primary market. As a consequence, the cost
of complying with the regulation is redirected towards nal good producers and consumers.
Hence, original manufacturers can see their prots increase. This observation corroborates
the Porter Hypothesis. Under some circumstances, the environmental regulation can also
increase consumer surplus.
A social planner who wants to stimulate remanufacturing activities can consider allowing
private collusion as an alternative to environmental regulation since it leads to a higher level
of remanufacturability. Moreover, collusion leads to a larger supply of high quality reman-
ufactured products and to lower prices on the aftermarket and, hence, increases consumer
surplus. The application of an environmental regulation reduces the threat of the outsider
and solves for the collective action problem. If the social planner opts for this option, it
should repress private collusions. When the variation in prots following the public inter-
vention is interpreted as the industrial degree of cooperation with the regulation, original
manufacturers will always o¤er stronger support, or lower opposition, when the technology
choice is initially subject to free-riding.
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